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A major problem in tackling many environmental issues, tramboundary and global in Wcu la r ,  
is the fundamental fairness concerns involved. These arise h m  the wide differences among 
countries in responsibility for the problems at hand and the degree to which they are affected by 
them, and the difficulty of distniuting fairly the costs and benefits of regulations among parties 
whose interests in and ability to pay for an agreement vary drastically. 
The acid rain negotiations in Eumpe is a prime case demonstrating that substantial emission 
reduction strategies must, among the core requirements involved, be viewed as fair if they are to 
be politically feasible and accepted, implemented, and honored in the long run. Research to date, 
however, bas focused almost exclusively on the analysis and generation of options which are 
effective in economic and, more recently, environmental terms. 
The study discusses the general fairness issues involved in attempts to control and reduce sulfur 
and nitrogen dioxide emissions in Europe, through negotiation in particular. The nature and some 
implications of the diverse principles underlying proposed strategies for managing the 
transboundary air pollution problem are analyzed. Explored is the potential applicability of certain 
analytic problem-solving tools in helping to bridge or reconcile, in a negotiation process, opposing 
positions regarding "fair" emission abatement strategies in Europe. 
This paper was presented at an international conference on Risk arid Faintas at the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, June 20-22, 1993. The 
confcrcncc was co-sponsored by IIASA's Risk Analysis and Policy Project, and the International 
Academy of the Environment, Geneva. The author is Deputy Director of the Global Security 
Programme at Cambridge University, U.K., and was a Research Scholar in the Processes of 
International Negotiation (PIN) Project at IlASA in 1992-1003. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A major problem in managing and ultimately resolving many environmental issues, 
transboundary and global in particular, is to tackle the fundamental fairness concerns involved. 
These arise notably from the wide differences among countries in responsibility for the 
problems at hand and the degree to which they are affected by them, and the difficulty of 
distributing fairly the costs and benefits of regulations among parties whose interests in and 
ability to pay for an agreement vary drastically. Yet, despite their extraordinary importance, 
fairness issues in environmental policies and negotiations have rarely been the subject of 
systematic research. 
The acid rain negotiations in Europe is a prime case demonstrating that substantial emission 
reduction strategies must, among the core requirements involved, be viewed as fail- if they are 
to be politically feasible and accepted, implemented, and honored in the long run. Research to 
date, however, has focused almost exclusively on the analysis and generation of options which 
are effective in economic and, more recently, environmental terms. Without addressing 
concerns about fairness, the latter -- even in the most favorable political context in which all 
parties genuinely strive at reaching agreement -- risk to remain hypothetical solutions 
uncapable of advancing the negotiations over Europe's acid rain problem. 
This paper has three purposes. First, it discusses the general fairness issues involved in 
attempts to control and reduce sulfur and nitrogen dioxide emissions in Europe, through 
negotiation in particular. Secondly, it brings out and analyses the nature and some 
implications of the diverse principles (most of them associated with a particular understanding 
of justice or fairness) underlying various proposed strategies for managing the transboundary 
air pollution problem. Thirdly, the paper begins to explore the potential applicability of 
certain analytic problem-solving tools in helping to bridge or reconcile, in a negotiation 
process, opposing positions regarding "fair" emission abatement strategies in Europe. No 
attempt is made to overview the nature and scope of Europe's transboundary air pollution 
problem, or acid rain negotiations to date -- subjects on which a number of studies have 
already been completed (e.g., Schneider, 1992; Alcamo, Shaw and Hordijk, 1990; Boehmer- 
Christiansen and Skea, 1991; Chossudovsky, 1988; Carroll, 1988; Shaw, 1992). 
2. Fairness in Acid Rain Ne~otiations: Some General Observations 
In the last few decades, acid rain--acid deposition formed in the atmosphere primarily from 
sulfur dioxide (S02) and nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions--has, like so many other 
environmental hazards, become increasingly transboundary and global in character. Scientific 
understanding has deepened dramatically about the sources of such emissions (notably coal 
and oil fired power stations and smelters, and motor vehicle exhausts), their transport across 
national boundaries, and extensive damage to forests, freshwaters, agricultural crops, 
ecosystems, and historical and cultural monuments, particularly in Europe but also in North 
America. Together with the depletion of the ozone layer, acid rain is today viewed widely as 
the most serious global environmental problem. To mention only a few of the numerous 
examples now recorded, acid deposition was found to have damaged about 86% of East 
German woodland and over 50% of West German forests in 1985 (Fraenkel, 1989), over 20% 
of Sweden's lakes, and drastically reduced and even eliminated entire fish populations in 
Norway (Brackley, 1990). 
In tandem with such developments, multilateral negotiation, and the multilateral cooperation 
resulting from it, have increasingly become recognized as primary tools for reducing the acid 
rain and other environmental problems--including water pollution, global climate change, 
desertification, the storage of hazardous industrial wastes, and the preservation of biological 
diversity. Yet despite the urgent need for joint measures on many of these issues, 
environmental negotiations have also proven more difficult than other international 
negotiations in many respects. Much observed among these difficulties in the research 
literature are the large number of parties, deep power asymmetries, and conflicting interests 
involved; the highly complex and global significance of the issues; insufficient scientific 
knowledge and uncertainty; and the necessarily on-going nature (inconclusiveness) of any 
negotiating process attempting to tackle them. These hurdles have lead some analysts to 
conclude that an entirely new approach to international negotiation must be developed to deal 
with today's and tomorrow's transboundary environmental problems successfully (e.g., 
Sjostedt, 1992). 
To this list of characteristics of environmental negotiations must be added another 
complicating factor: the prominent role played by issues of fairness, and   pic ally conjlicti~zg 
concepts of fairness held by parties. There are a number of reasons for this prominence. First, 
the very transboundary nature of environmental problems such as acid rain, and the need to 
rely on voluntary cooperation in tackling them, require the negotiation of solutions viewed by 
every key party as fair and worth honoring. It is an issue area in which traditional sources of 
power or coercive measures are of relatively little use in inducing "weaker" states (e.g., 
economically less developed countries) to join and comply with an agreement, and in which 
only a few such states--e.g., heavy polluters--often have veto power in that their non- 
cooperation could render a treaty ineffective. It is also an issue area in which existing 
applicable rules of international law--for example, principles of good neighborliness and 
equitable utilization of shared resources--do not stipulate specific obligations or measures on 
the part of states, but at best provide an obligation and a framework for states to negotiate 
agreement on concrete and effective actions (Giindling, 1991; BrunnCe, 1988). 
Secondly, negotiations over acid rain, like many other environmental problems, involve 
continuous and frequent encounters between parties over a longer time period. More than one- 
time bargaining situations, they thus build up expectations about fair behavior and the nature 
of fair alternatives. As well, acid rain talks involve highly valued and scarce resources; ethical 
issues; and benefits, costs (burdens), and risks which affect parties unequally, and which are 
indivisible or at least not easily redistributed. In international relationships with any one of 
these characteristics, concepts and issues of fairness tend to figure prominently (Albin, 1993). 
Thirdly, sharp asymmetries between parties contribute not only to the prominence of fairness 
issues, but also to the divergences in parties' perceptions of fairness. In acid rain negotiations, 
these asymmetries concern notably wide differences in contributions to the problem between 
heavy polluters (e.g., Poland, Germany, the UK) and countries which are predominantly 
importers of air pollution (e.g., Sweden, Finland, Norway); in sensitivity to and costs suffered 
due to acid rain (given the nature of countries' ecosystems, proximity to polluting sources, and 
so forth); in dependency on and gains to be derived from regulatory agreements; and in 
economic, technological, and political ability to accept and implement control measures. 
One may usefully speak of four, partly overlapping types of fairness issues, all of which play a 
role in acid rain and other international environmental negotiations to different degrees. 
Struct~lral fairness concerns the overarching conditions and constraints within which the 
negotiation process unfolds--e.g., the identity and representation of participating parties, ways 
in which issues are linked (or de-linked) on the agenda, and features and established rules of 
the negotiating site or forum. Process fairness refers notably to ways in which parties relate 
to and treat each other as they negotiate and build agreement (e.g., refrain from the use of 
"unfair" deceptive or coercive tactics). Procedural fairness concerns the characteristics of 
specific mechanisms such as problem-solving techniques, reciprocation, and random methods 
used for arriving at an agreement--e.g., their tendency to demand equal concessions, give equal 
chances to parties to "win", or to produce fair outcomes. Outcome fairness refers to the 
principles underlying the allocation of benefits and burdens in a negotiated agreement, and the 
extent to which this allocation (agreement) is considered just and reasonable in the longer 
term--for example, in view of unforeseen developments such new scientific information 
(Albin, 1992, 1993). Important structural and process fairness issues in environmental 
negotiations today include how the interests of future generations should be measured and who 
can represent them properly (e.g., states as is the case today, or a formal transnational body), 
so that problems are not resolved in ways that subordinate these interests to those of the 
present generation. 
Multilateral negotiations over transboundary air pollution controls in Europe first got 
underway in the mid-1970ts, driven by Sweden which had proved that foreign sources of SO. 
emissions were primarily responsible for the acidification of its lakes. The 1979 Convention on 
Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), signed by 32 states and the European 
Community (EC) within the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), established 
only the vague obligations to limit and, "as far as possible," gradually reduce and prevent 
transboundary air pollution. Yet the LRTAP Convention, together with EC environmental 
legislation, have provided the main frameworks for subsequent negotiations over specific 
controls on and reductions in SO?, and NOx emissions. These include the negotiations resulting 
in the adoption of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, the 1988 Sofia Protocol, and the 1988 EC Large 
Combustion Plant (LCP) Directive, among other agreements. Generally speaking, the overall 
structure, process, and procedures of European acid rain negotiations are today well- 
established and accepted. 
By contrast, fairness issues relating to the outcome(s) of these talks in the near and longer 
term are at the very heart of the negotiations themselves, and may well prove intractable. In 
the now ongoing negotiations on a new sulfur protocol within the UNECE-LRTAP 
Convention in Geneva, the tendency is to consider emission reductions based on the varying 
sensitivities of the ecosystems to acid deposition (Klaassen, Amann & Schopp, 1992). While 
promising to be more effective environmentally and economically than uniform reductions, if 
indeed possible to eventually agree upon and implement, this approach highlights the grossly 
unfair distribution of benefits and burdens among parties which may result from emission 
regulations. The burdens notably concern the high economic costs of investing in technologies 
and measures to abate acid rain, but also social and political costs. The benefits, more difficult 
to assess with any precision, include lesser damage to forests, agricultural crops, freshwaters 
and fish production, human health, and buildings. 
Of course, fairness is not the only major factor explaining the dynamics of acid rain 
negotiations, nor is it the sole criterion on basis of which countries will judge the overall 
wisdom and acceptability of a particular outcome. For example, pure self-interests in emission 
controls, veto coalitions formed on basis of these, and redefinitions of such self-interests in 
countries such as West Germany, France and Italy due their own experiences of acid rain 
damage and new scientific evidence, have certainly contributed extensively to the impasses 
and breakthroughs in the process toward specific agreements on emission controls (Porter and 
Brown, 1991). Fairness arguments are used by parties for tactical purposes as well. Yet the 
increasing dependency on emission control agreements has required many European countries 
to enlarge their individual cost-benefit analyses to include the other sides' perspectives on fair 
and acceptable options.- Indeed, the acid rain problem involves unusually clear-cut fairness 
issues --who should have to reduce emissions, by how much and what time, and at whose cost, 
given countries' disparate situations and resources -- lends itself particularly well to studying 
the role of "genuine" notions of fairness in negotiations. The discussion here will focus on 
parties' divergent concepts of outcorne fairness in major European aid rain negotiations to 
date, as reflected in their positions and proposed emission abatement strategies. 
3. Fairness Principles for Tackling the Acid Rain Problem 
There are three major principles of outcome fairness in the allocation of resources and burdens, 
discussed extensively in the social-psychological (experimental) and negotiation literature: 
e q u a l i ~ ,  equiq,  and need (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976). Major positions and proposals 
advanced regarding emission reduction strategies in Europe emerge clearly as direct examples 
or variations of these three fundamental understandings of distributive justice.l 
1 Kasperson (1983, chapter 15 in particular) discusses the applicability of these principles to 
issues of outcome fairness in radioactive waste management. 
Other norms of outcome fairness with little, if any, applicability to acid rain negotiations 
include "no-envy" or "supe~ainzess,  " which holds that a certain allocation is fair if, and only 
3.1 Equality 
Originating in the Enlightenment and the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the principle of 
equality, also termed "impartial justice," holds that parties should receive the same or 
comparable rewards (costs), irrespective of their contributions or needs (responsibility for the 
problem at hand). Specific interpretations of the norm include "equal shares," which divides 
resources, gains or costs in equal amounts between parties; "compromise 'in the middle'," which 
splits the difference between parties' initial positions (yielding a different outcome than equal 
shares unless opening positions are identical); "equal excess," which allocates resources to each 
party corresponding to the value of its best alternative to a negotiated agreement, plus half of the 
remaining resources (Komorita & Kravitz, 1979); and "equal sacrifice," which holds that parties' 
concessions should make them suffer equally (Pruitt, 1981). The principle often poses problems 
such as determining what is to be treated equally, how to apply it to indivisible or heterogeneous 
goods, and how to assure an outcome of actual equality when parties are very unequal in some 
respect. Yet it is frequently applied in arms control, environmental, and other international 
negotiations (see, for example, Druckman and Harris, 1990; Zartman et al., forthcoming), and 
particularly when parties view themselves as roughly equal in relevant forms of power. 
There are at least two major explanations for the frequent resort to the equality principle in 
negotiations. First, it converges with common, intuitive ideas about "intrinsic" or "impartial" 
fairness (e.g., "all people or countries should be treated the same"), and enjoys wide 
acceptability as a basis for concession-making which produces fair compromise agreements. 
Secondly, the equality principle is characterized by relative simplicity and lack of ambiguity 
both in concept and application. Thus, more than other norms, the equality principle often helps 
parties to reduce competition, coordinate expectations and concessions, and reach compromises 
in ambiguous negotiating situations in which different fairness principles and alternatives are 
advocated; and to justify and sell the outcome to important constituencies. Experimental 
if, no party prefers the other's share of the (disputed) resources to its own (Foley, 1967; Baumol, 
1987); retribution ("punitive justice"), which says that a party guilty of some wrong in the past 
should be accorded fewer resources (gains);the priority principle, according to which the 
"winner", while determined proportionally (e.g., through a lottery or voting), gets more than a 
proportional share of the resources; and subtractive justice, according to which the disputed 
goods are taken away from both or all parties (which can also be understood as a form of 
equality; i.e., equal treatment of parties). Precedent, whereby a previous comparable case or 
decision serves as the rule for determining allocations in the outcome, may be applicable in some 
respects to acid rain but not as the sole distributive criterion. 
findings suggest that parties are likely to reach agreement fasterlan agreement of greater stability 
and at a faster speed if they seek an outcome based specifically on equality. 
These factors are certainly significant in explaining the widespread reliance on equality in 
European proposals, negotiations, and agreements regarding acid rain to date. In a situation of 
diverse and apparently opposing positions between countries on fair and acceptable emission 
abatement controls, there has clearly been pressures, increasing willingness and moves toward 
endorsing typical equality alternatives -- notably ceilings on, and freezes and equal percentage 
reductions in, current SO2 and NOx emission levels with fixed time frames. Calls for such 
agreements were first made, unsuccessfully, by net importers of acid rain -- notably Sweden, 
Finland, Norway, and Canada -- in the mid-1970's. However, the March 1984 formation of the 
"30 Percent Club" -- a group of originally nine West European states and Canada committing 
themselves, among other things, to unilateral cuts of at least 30% in their 1980 levels of SO2 
emissions over a ten-year period -- became a symbolically significant act which created 
political pressures on other countries to follow suit and, notably, a standard viewed as fair 
against which they would be evaluated. Six months later, another eight West and East 
European countries joined the Club (Regens and Rycroft, 1988). 
The 30 Percent Club set the stage for the talks leading to the 1985 Helsinki Protocol on the 
Reduction of SO2 emissions. It was signed by 21 states -- including several heavy polluters 
such as West Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, and France which previously had vetoed 
proposals for specific emission controls. In these negotiations, across-the-board 30% cuts in 
SO2 emissions by 1993, based on 1980 emission levels, emerged again as the fair and 
acceptable formula to most participating countries among the many divergent positions 
advanced.* A major hurdle in the talks was the U.S.' and Great Britain's argument that an 
earlier base year be selected so as to credit them for their emission reductions prior to 1980, 
thus requiring insignificant or no further reductions of them. Most participating countries, 
viewing these pre-1980 reductions insufficient environmentally, rejected the demand as unfair, 
and the Protocol was not signed by three major exporters of acid rain -- Poland (for its lack of 
abatement technology), the U.S., and the U.K. (Griindling, 1991). Yet at a later EEC 
environmental meeting the U.K. suggested the same idea of a uniform 30% reduction in SO2 
emissions by 1993 (Regens and Rycroft, 1988), a demonstration of the then widespread 
2 See "Positions and Strategies of the Different Contracting Parties to the Convention on Long- 
Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their 
Transboundary Fluxes," August 6,1985. Document ECEIEB. AIRl7. 
consensus on the equality principle as the basis for multilateral compromise agreements on 
emissions control. 
The intrinsic appeal, simplicity, and explicitness of the equality principle are important 
advantages in any negotiating situation, and not at least in complex international 
environmental negotiations over problems such as acid rain. Yet one may question whether 
the outcomes it produces are necessairly fair or impartial in any meaningful sense of the word, 
both theoretically and in real cases. There is good reason to do so particularly when parties' 
conditions or positions are very unequal, as also noted in the negotiation literature (Iklk, 1964; 
Schelling, 1960; Druckman and Harris, 1990). These inequalities may concern, among others: 
resources available to tackle the problem; past and current responsibility for it and thus 
entitlements to the resources at stake (e.g., clean air, emissions permits); and worth attached to 
resolving the problem. Is it really fair to demand equal sacrifices from, or impose equal costs 
on, rich and poor countries, and on heavy polluters and victims of air pollution? 
Virtually all these inequalities exist in the European acid rain problematique. A first major 
problem with typical abatement strategies based on equality is the absence of objective criteria 
to select a required percentage reduction or ceiling, a particular year on basis of which 
reductions will be made or the ceilinglfreeze imposed, and a target year by which the 
requirements are to be achieved (Haigh, 1989). No matter what percentages or years are 
selected they are bound to be arbitrary -- for example, in failing to account for parties' degree 
of responsibility for the problem in terms of past emissions reductions and past or current 
emissions levels.3 Further, the approach discourages parties from undertaking additional, 
unilateral emissions reductions. Another major problem concerns the widely different costs 
and net gains which countries will experience to achieve the same reduction or limit by a given 
year due to their disparate economic, technological and other conditions to use or develop 
emission control techniques -- whether "add-on" technologies (e.g., use of low sulfur fuels, 
desulfurization of fuels, limits on industrial emissions), the development of alternative energy 
sources, energy conservation, or other abatement strategies. Many polluting countries, among 
them Eastern European, which are thus required to undertake the greatest reductions in 
3 "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the 
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 Percent (July 8, 
1985)." In Executive Body for the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution. 
Report of the Third Session of the Executive Body, United Nations Commission for Europe, 
U.N. ECE Doc. ECElEB.AIR17, Annex 1, August 6,1985. 





















